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Abstract
This paper is the first to perform a comprehensive estimation of employee stock option ex-
ercise behavior and option cost to firms. We develop a GMM-based methodology, robust to
heteroskedasticity and correlation across exercises, for estimating the rate of voluntary option
exercise as a function of the stock price path and of various firm and option holder character-
istics. We use it to estimate an exercise function for a sample of 1.3 million employee-option
grants to 530,266 employees at 103 publicly-traded firms between 1981–2009. We use the
estimated exercise functions in a simulation based valuation model to analyze the effect of
different firm and option characteristics on option value, and show that the Black-Scholes-
based methods used in practice can create systematic biases.
JEL classification: G14.
Despite the decline in option use since the 2005 change in their accounting treatment,
employee stock options remain a major component of corporate compensation and a material
cost to firms. Frydman and Jenter (2010) find options still represented 25% of CEO pay
in 2008. More broadly, Equilar (2011) report that the median number of shares underlying
outstanding options at S&P 1500 firms was 4.4% of common shares outstanding in 2010,
down from 6.1% in 2006, with almost 1% of outstanding shares still allocated to new option
grants. Meanwhile, the share of options granted to CEOs and named executives has risen
from 21% to 26% over that period.
Employee option valuation methods clearly affect corporate decisions about compensa-
tion structure and allocation, as the response to the 2005 accounting standard, FAS123R, has
shown. Most firms currently use approximations permitted by FAS123R and the subsequent
SAB 110, but their accuracy for valuation can vary widely and systematically with firm
characteristics. The difficulty in valuing employee options is that these are long-lived Amer-
ican options, so their value depends crucially on how employees exercise them. Yet, because
employees face hedging constraints, standard option theory does not directly apply. For
example, evidence indicates that employees systematically exercise options on non-dividend
paying stocks well before expiration (see, for example, Huddart and Lang (1996), Bettis,
Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005)), which substantially reduces their value.
Pricing by no arbitrage is still possible as long as the exercise decision generates an option
payoff that is subject only to hedgeable risks, such as stock price risk, and diversifiable risks,
such as uncertainties that are idiosyncratic across employees. The option valuation problem
then reduces to accurately characterizing the option payoffs, that is, the exercise policies of
executives. Until recently, however, full-blown estimation has not been possible because of
insufficient data and inadequate methodology. Detailed employee option grant, exercise, and
cancellation data are proprietary and very difficult to obtain for a large number of firms.
In addition, traditional hazard rate models are not suitable for describing voluntary option
exercises, where partial and repeated exercise of options from a given grant is the norm.
This paper is the first to perform a complete empirical estimation of employee stock
option exercise behavior and option cost to firms. Reliable estimation of any option exercise
model requires a large sample that includes a wide variety of stock price paths. We estimate
our model using a comprehensive sample of option exercise grant and exercise data for 1.3
million option grants to 530,266 employees at 103 publicly-traded firms between 1981–2009.
The proprietary data were provided by corporate participants in a sponsored research project
that was funded by the Society of Actuaries. The methodology presented in this paper is the
first step in developing an actuarial science for valuing compensatory stock options, similar
to that for pension liabilities.
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In our estimation we find that the rate of voluntary option exercise is positively related to
the level of the stock price, the imminence of a dividend, and negatively related to the stock
return correlation with the S&P 500 Composite Index, consistent with the theory of optimal
employee option exercise in the presence of a hedging asset. We also find the exercise rates
are negatively related to stock return volatility and option time to expiration, consistent
with standard option theory. In addition, the exercise rate is higher when the stock price is
in the 90th percentile of its distribution over the past year or in the two weeks after a vesting
date. In addition, holding all else equal, men are more likely to exercise their options than
women, and exercise rates are decreasing with employee age.
The estimated exercise function, together with a model for involuntary terminations, can
be combined with Monte Carlo simulation to calculate the value of these options to sharehold-
ers, taking the employees’ exercise and termination behavior into account. This approach is
similar to the prepayment modeling and valuation methods developed for mortgage-backed
securities (see, for example, Schwartz and Torous (1989)). We show that option cost in-
creases with volatility, decreases with the dividend rate, increases with correlation, decreases
with the employment termination rate, and is nonmonotonic with respect to the length of
the option vesting period.
We compare the prices based on our estimation with the modified Black-Scholes (MBS)
method and the Simplified Method (SM) allowed as an approximations by the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (FASB). These approximation methods use Black Scholes value
with option’s stated expiration date replaced by either by its expected term or the aver-
age of its vesting date and expiration date. We find that the MBS approximation and the
Simplified Method approximation errors vary systematically with the underlying stock re-
turn parameters and the option contractual features. This suggests that there is no simple
adjustment to Black-Scholes value that can approximate ESO value without systematically
overstating or understating option value for particular kinds of firms or options.
1 Previous Literature
The principles of employee option stock valuation and the need to study exercise behavior are
well-understood in the literature. One approach that has been taken is to model the exercise
decision theoretically. The employee presumably chooses an option exercise policy as part
of a greater utility maximization problem that includes other decisions, such as portfolio,
consumption, and effort choice, and this typically leads to early exercise for the purpose of
diversification. Papers that develop utility-maximizing models and then calculate the implied
cost of options to shareholders include Huddart (1994), Detemple and Sundaresan (1999),
2
Ingersoll (2006), Leung and Sircar (2009), Grasselli and Henderson (2009), and Carpenter,
Stanton, and Wallace (2010).
Combining theory and data, papers such as Carpenter (1998) and Bettis et al. (2005)
calibrate utility-maximizing models to mean exercise times and stock prices in the data,
and then infer option value. However, these papers provide no formal estimation and the
approach relies on the validity of the utility-maximizing models used. Huddart and Lang
(1996) and Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) provide more flexible empirical descriptions of
option exercise patterns, but do not go as far as option valuation. Two recent approaches,
Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2006) and Klein and Maug (2009) estimate exercise
behavior using a hazard model, but this specification is inappropriate for option valuation
because employees exercise random fractions of outstanding option grants.
A number of analytic methods for approximating executive stock option value have also
been proposed in the literature. The FASB currently permits using the Black-Scholes formula
with the expiration date replaced by the option’s expected life. Jennergren and Na¨slund
(1993), Carr and Linetsky (2000)), and Cvitanic´, Wiener, and Zapatero (2008) derive analytic
formulas for option value assuming exogenously specified exercise boundaries and stopping
rates. Hull and White (2004) propose a model in which exercise occurs when the stock
price reaches an exogenously specified multiple of the stock price and forfeiture occurs at
an exogenous rate. However, until the accuracy of these methods can be determined, the
usefulness of these approximations cannot be assessed.
2 Modeling Exercise Behavior
This section first describes the theoretical foundation for modeling employee exercise behav-
ior and then develops a empirical model that is both flexible enough to capture observed
exercise behavior and suitable as a basis for option valuation.
2.1 Theoretical Foundation
In the standard theory of American option exercise, the option holder chooses a policy to
maximize option value, and for an ordinary American call on a stock in a Black-Scholes
framework, the value-maximizing policy is described by a critical stock price, above which
it is optimal to exercise and below which it is optimal to continue holding the option. The
critical stock price is increasing in the time to expiration, the stock return volatility, and the
interest rate, and decreasing in the dividend rate (see, for example, Kim (1990)). However,
employee stock options are nontransferable and employees face hedging constraints, so in
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order to diversify away from excessive stock price exposure, employees may exercise options
early. A number of papers rationalize this behavior in models of employee option exercise in
which the option holder chooses a policy to maximize expected utility, subject to constraints
on selling the option and the underlying stock. These include Huddart (1994), Detemple
and Sundaresan (1999), Ingersoll (2006), Leung and Sircar (2009), Grasselli and Henderson
(2009), and Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2010).
For example, Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2010) model a risk averse employee who
chooses both an exercise policy for his options and a dynamic trading strategy in the market
and riskless asset for his outside wealth to maximize expected utility. They show that the
optimal exercise policy need not be characterized by a single critical stock price boundary,
though it is for certain utility functions, such as constant relative risk averse utility. They
also show either analytically or numerically how the critical stock price, or more generally,
the employee’s continuation region, varies with employee risk aversion and wealth and with
the stock return volatility, dividend rate, and the correlation between the stock return and
the market return. For example, the continuation region is smaller if the employee has
greater absolute risk aversion and thus is larger with greater employee wealth if he has
decreasing absolute risk aversion. In addition, the continuation region is smaller the greater
the dividend rate. In numerical examples with constant relative risk averse utility, the critical
stock price is increasing in the correlation between the stock return and the market return,
in the region of positive correlation, because the more the option risk can be hedged in the
outside portfolio, the more attractive the option position becomes. On the other hand, the
effect of greater volatility or longer time to expiration is ambiguous, because of the conflicting
effects of the employee risk aversion and the convexity of the option payoff.
2.2 Empirical Model
Although the structural models in the theoretical literature provide guidance, a more flex-
ible, reduced-form model is necessary to capture the complexities of real employee exercise
patterns. At first sight, it seems natural to use hazard rates to model the exercise of employee
stock options, since they have often been used in the finance literature to model apparently
similar events, such as mortgage prepayment (see Schwartz and Torous (1989)) and corporate
bond default (see, for example, Duffie and Singleton (1999)).1 However, whereas it makes
sense to think of the prepayment of one mortgage as independent of the prepayment of an-
other, conditional on the level of interest rates, ESOs are typically exercised in blocks. As a
1A hazard rate is defined as the likelihood (per period) of an option’s being exercised in the next instant,
conditional on not having being exercised previously. For good introductions to hazard rate analysis, see
Cox (1972) or Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980).
4
result, the exercise of one option in a given grant held by an individual is extremely highly
correlated with the exercise of another option in the same grant held by the same individual.
It is also quite highly correlated with the exercise of options in other grants held by the
same individual. This high degree of correlation between options makes it difficult to use
standard econometric techniques, which assume independence between events, to estimate
hazard rates at the individual option level.2
One attempt to solve this problem was suggested by Armstrong et al. (2006). Instead of
using a hazard rate to model the exercise of individual options, they use a hazard rate to
model the exercise behavior of an entire grant of options held by an individual. Aggregating
in this way gets around the problem of correlation between individual option exercises, but it
introduces a new problem. Whereas a hazard rate describes an event with two states – either
something has happened, or it has not – the proportion of an option grant that is exercised
in a given period is essentially a continuous variable, which can take on any value between
zero and one. Armstrong et al. (2006) work with the dummy variable Exercisei,k,t, which
indicates whether or not employee i exercises at least 25% of the vested and unexercised
options in grant k on day t (and at least 10% of all options from the grant). This addresses
some of the correlation issues described above, but introduces new problems of its own.
First, unlike, say, death from a disease, this variable can equal one more than once, so
standard hazard rate estimation techniques may not immediately apply. Second, important
information is lost in this aggregation process. For example, consider two option holders who
have the same likelihood of exercising on any given date, however, option holder 1 always
exercises 25% of the remaining grant whenever he exercises, whereas option holder 2 always
exercises 100% of his remaining options. The conditional probability of a given option’s
being exercised at any instant is four times as high for options held by option holder 2 versus
option 1, so their options will have very different values, yet the Exercise variable modeled
by Armstrong et al. (2006) would behave exactly the same way for the two option holders.
Their valuation methodology assumes 100% of a given vesting tranche is exercised at the
hazard rate estimated for exercises in excess of 25%, an inconsistency which would appear
to overstate the rate of early exercise and understate option value. Klein and Maug (2009)
use a similar approach, counting exercises as events if the fraction exercised out of a given
vesting tranche exceeds a pre-specified threshold, and thus fail to model the distribution of
the fraction exercised. Moreover, they do not appear to account for the correlation between
exercises of different vesting tranches from the same grant.
2This issue also arises in modeling corporate bond default. One popular solution, when the number of
firms involved is small, has been to use “copula functions”, which explicitly model this correlation [See,
for example, Li (2001)]. However, in our case the number of options (and hence the number of correlation
coefficients) is too high to be feasible.
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A solution to all of the problems above is to abandon the hazard rate approach altogether
and instead to model the fraction of each grant exercised each period. Heath, Huddart, and
Lang (1999) follow this approach, regressing the fraction of each grant exercised against
various explanatory variables. However, their regression approach has some problems. In
particular, it may generate expected exercise fractions that are negative or greater than
one, both of which cause problems for valuation.3 One possible solution is to transform the
proportion exercised, such as by using a logistic transformation,
log
(
y
1− y
)
,
which can take on any value between −∞ and +∞, and use this on the right hand side of the
regression. Unfortunately, by Jensen’s inequality, the expected proportion exercising is not
just the inverse transformation of the expected transformed proportion. More important, this
approach cannot handle the numerous dates on which no options are exercised at all. Heath,
Huddart, and Lang (1999) also aggregate across individuals, thus discarding potentially
important information about the differences in exercise behavior across individuals.
Like Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999), we also model the fraction of each grant exercised
by each holder each period, but we do so in a manner that generates consistent estimates
of expected exercise rates that are guaranteed to be between zero and one, while explicitly
handling the correlation between option exercises within and between different grants held
by the same individual. Our approach, based on the fractional logistic approach of Papke
and Wooldridge (1996), also allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity in the exercise rates.
Let yijt be the fraction exercised at time t of grant j held by individual i, and write
yijt = G(Xijtβ) + uijt, (1)
where Xt is some set of covariates in It, the information set at date t, where G, the expected
fraction exercised at date t, is a function satisfying 0 < G(z) < 1, and where
E(uijt | It) = 0,
E(uijt ui′j′t′) = 0 if i 6= i′ or t 6= t′.
From now on, we shall use the logistic function,
G(Xijtβ) =
exp(Xijtβ)
1 + exp(Xijtβ)
,
3Attempting to remedy this, for example by truncating the variables, will lead to biases.
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which takes on only values between zero and one. Note that, while we are assuming the
residuals ijt are uncorrelated between individuals and across time periods, we are allowing for
ijt to be arbitrarily correlated between different grants held by the same individual at a given
point in time, and we are not making any further assumptions about the exact distribution
of ijt, or even about its variance. In particular, unlike assuming a beta distribution for yijt
(see Mullahy (1990) or Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004)), we are allowing a strictly positive
probability that yijt takes on the extreme values zero or one.
As in Papke and Wooldridge (1996), we estimate the parameter vector β using quasi-
maximum likelihood (see Gourie´roux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984)) with the Bernoulli
log-likelihood function,
lijt(β) = yijt log [G(Xijtβ)] + (1− yijt) log [1−G(Xijtβ)] . (2)
Estimation involves solving
max
β
∑
i,j,t
lijt(β).
The K first order conditions, corresponding to the K elements of β, are given by
∑
i,j,t
dlijt(β)
dβ
=
∑
i,j,t
Xijt
[
G′(Xijtβ)
(
yijt
G(Xijtβ)
− 1− yijt
1−G(Xijtβ)
)]
=
∑
i,j,t
Xijt (yijt −G(Xijtβ)) (3)
= 0.
Equation (1) implies (using iterated expectations) that the population expectation of these
first order conditions is zero, hence this QML estimator, β̂, is a (consistent) GMM estimator
of β, with no assumptions other than Equation (1). Following the notation in Papke and
Wooldridge (1996), define the residual
ûijt ≡ yijt −G(Xijtβ̂),
and define
ĝijt ≡ G′(Xijtβ̂) .
To allow for heteroskedasticity and for correlation between option grants held by a given
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individual, write
var(u) = Ω =

Σ1 . . . 0
. . .
... Σi
...
. . .
0 . . . ΣI

,
where each Σ block corresponds to all of the option grants held by a given individual on a
particular date. Then the asymptotic covariance matrix of β̂ takes the “sandwich” form (see
Gourie´roux et al. (1984)),
var
(
β̂
)
= Â
−1
B̂Â−1,
where
Â =
∑
i,j,t
∂2lijt(β̂)
∂β∂β′
=
∑
i,j,t
ĝijtXijtX
′
ijt, (4)
and
B̂ = X′Ω̂X,
where X is a matrix containing all of the stacked Xijt values, and Ω̂ is a consistent estimator
of Ω given by
Ω̂ =

Σ̂1 . . . 0
. . .
... Σ̂i
...
. . .
0 . . . Σ̂I

where
Σ̂i = ûiû
′
i.
This covariance matrix is robust both to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and to arbitrary cor-
relation between the residuals in a given block.4
4For further discussion of calculating standard errors in the presence of clustering, see Rogers (1993),
Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003), Wooldridge (2003) and Petersen (2009).
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3 Data
As discussed above, our estimation strategy is carried out using a proprietary data set
comprising complete histories of employee stock option grants, vesting structures, and op-
tion exercise and cancellation events for all employees who received options at 103 publicly
traded corporations between 1981 and 2009.5 As shown in Table 1, there is considerable
heterogeneity in the sample of firms in terms of their industry type, reported at one-digit
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, firm size, as measured by market cap and
numbers of employees, revenue growth over the period, and stock return volatility. Sample
firm dividend rates are low and many firms pay no dividend, so early exercise is driven by
other factors. Sample firm’s return correlation with S&P Composite Index average from
25% to 37% across sectors, suggesting employees have some scope for hedging their option
compensation by reducing their market exposure in their outside portfolios.
3.1 Proprietary option data
Our unit of analysis is an employee-grant-day. For each option grant we merge the appropri-
ate path of daily split-adjusted stock prices and dividends, starting at the initial grant date,
to the path of outstanding option vesting and exercise events for all grants and employees.
These daily paths are constructed using detailed information on the contractual option vest-
ing structure, the exercise events, and the cancellation events recorded for each grant. We
track the employee-grant-days and a series of time-varying covariates until the options in the
grant are fully exercised, the options are cancelled, or we reach the end of the sample period
of December 31, 2009.
Table 2 summarizes the size and structure of the sample of option data by industry and
in aggregate. In total there are 22,694,875 option exercises across 1,314,724 grants to 530,266
employees. On average, there are 2.5 grants per employee, but there is considerable variability
across firms and employees, with some employees receiving dozens of option grants. For the
firms for which we have the employee ranking of the employee, the largest grant recipients
are typically the CEO or senior managers.
Table 3 summarizes the size, vesting structure, and maturity of option grants in the
sample. The average grant has $49,984 worth of underlying shares at the grant date, but
this varies widely across industry, with the greatest mean and variance of grant size in the
finance industry. The combined effects of the potentially large number of grants per employee
5The data were obtained as part of a research grant written by the authors and funded by the Society
of Actuaries. In addition, we thank Terrence Adamson at AON Consulting who also provided data for this
study.
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and the size of these grants implies that individual employees may hold large inventories of
options with different strikes, expiration dates, and vesting structures. This feature of the
data introduces significant correlation across the exercise decisions of individual employees.
There is likely to be high correlation in the exercise decisions across grants that are held by
the same individual. A particular strength of our fractional logistic estimator is that it does
not require assumptions of independence across exercise events. We also pool by employee
and correct our standard errors to account for our pooled structure.
Vesting structures also vary widely, both across and within firms in our sample, and can
be complex. The average grant has 4.13 vesting dates, but some have as many as 60 vesting
dates. An example of a vesting structure that would lead to a large maximum would be
a grant with a 25% vest at the end of the first year and then 2.08% monthly vests over
the next 36 months. The minima are generated by “cliff vests” where all the options in a
given grant vest on the same day. Another feature of the grants that exhibits important
heterogeneity across firms is the percentage of options that vest on the first vesting dates,
with industry means ranging from 33% in SIC 3, which includes technology firms, to 92% in
SIC 4, transportation, communications, and utilities.
The only homogeneous contractual feature of employee stock option grants across firms
is the maturity in months from the issuance date to the date of expiry. The term of executive
stock options is quite uniformly ten years although there are some twenty-year and one-year
maturity options granted on the part of some firms. At the employee-level, the employees in
our sample are in some cases managing as many as ten different contractual option vesting
structures in their inventory of options.
Table 4 summarizes exercise patterns in the sample. Options are exercised very early.
At the time of exercise, the average option has 5.6 years remaining to expiration and has
only been in the money and vested for 292 days. These patterns are consistent with those
documented by Huddart and Lang (1996). On average, the option is 439% in the money at
the time of exercise, and more than half the time, the stock price is near its annual high. At
the time of exercise, an average of 85% of vested options are exercised. This sample includes
grants to all firm employees, many of which are very small. Among larger grants, fractional
exercise is much more pervasive, and very small fractions are exercised in some cases, which
motivates the development of our fractional logistic estimation strategy.
In summary, there are three features of the stock option exercise patterns observed in
our sample. First, many employees hold more than one option grant and make exercise
decisions over more than one vested option at any given time. For this reason, estimation
strategies must account for the correlated decision structure of employee option exercise.
Second, both the contractual vesting structure and the exogenous price paths appear to
10
have strong effects on option exercise patterns, thus careful controls for both of these feature
on a daily basis must be included in a successful estimation strategy. Finally, many option
positions are exercised fractionally, that is the proportion of the outstanding options that are
exercised at exercise events can be substantially less than one. For this reason, a successful
econometric methodology must account for path dependent fractional exercise behavior or
risk introducing significant misspecification bias and inaccurate forecasts of exercise timing.
3.2 The covariates
Employees may voluntarily choose to exercise options or they may be forced to do so because
of impending employment termination or option expiration. To estimate the model of vol-
untary exercise, we begin with the sample of employee-grant-days on which the option is in
the money and vested and then eliminate those days that are within six months of the grant
expiration date or six months of a cancellation of any option by that employee, because most
cancellations are associated with employment termination. The remaining employee-grant-
days are treated as days on which the employee has a choice about whether and how many
options to exercise. To explain the fraction of options exercised by a given employee from a
given grant on a given day, as specified by Equation (1), we choose as covariates variables
drawn from optimal option exercise theory, such as Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2010),
as well as behavioral variables identified in empirical studies such as Heath, Huddart, and
Lang (1999).
Since employee stock options are non-transferable, the optimal exercise policy for these
options can look quite different from that for standard American call options, as theoretical
models of the optimal employee exercise policy have shown. In particular, the need for
diversification can lead an employee to exercise much earlier than standard theory would
predict. In virtually every model of optimal exercise, however, the degree to which the
option is in the money is an important determinant of the exercise decision, though the
nature of the relationship can vary. In both standard option theory, and in many models
of employee option exercise, the option holders exercises once the stock price rises above a
critical boundary. Intuition also suggests that in practice, exercise become more attractive
as the option gets deeper in the money and more of its total value shifts to its exercise value.
The variable Price-to-strike ratio, the employee-grant-day ratio of the split-adjusted price of
the stock to the split-adjusted option strike price captures the degree to which the option is
in the money.
Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2010) prove very generally that the dividend effect for
employee option exercise is qualitatively the same for employee option exercise decisions as
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for standard, transferable options. That is, a higher dividend makes early exercise more
attractive, all else equal. The variable Dividend in next two weeks is the product of an
indicator that a dividend will be paid within the next 14 calendar days and the ratio of the
dividend payment to the current stock price.
The theoretical effect of higher stock return volatility on the exercise decision is more
complicated for employee options than the simple negative effect from standard theory.
Employee risk aversion and the convexity of the option payoff have offsetting effects on
employees’ attitudes toward volatility, and the net effect is an open empirical question. The
variable Volatility is the daily volatility estimated from the stock return over the 66 trading
days prior to the given employee-grant-day.
Unlike in standard theory, the degree to which the employee can hedge the option position
in an outside portfolio is an important theoretical determinant of the exercise decision,
and Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2010) and others have shown that the higher the
correlation between the stock return and the return on a tradeable asset, the lower the
propensity to exercise early. The variable Correlation is the correlation between the stock
return and the return on the S&P 500 Composite Index estimated from daily returns over
the three months prior to the given employee-grant-day.
The theoretical effect of more time to expiration on the exercise decision can also be more
complicated for employee options than the simple negative effect from standard theory, and
is thus also an open empirical question. The variable Time to expiration is the number of
calendar days from the given employee-grant-day to the expiration date of the grant.
Recent empirical studies of employee stock option exercise report links between behavioral
indicators, or “rules of thumb”, that employees appear to rely upon in making their option
exercise decisions. Armstrong et al. (2006) find a statistically significant association between
the timing of vesting events and option exercise. They argue that recent exercise events
both mechanically affect an employees’ ability to exercise their options and may also serve
as a periodic reminder to employees to evaluate the value of their option positions. Heath,
Huddart, and Lang (1999) and Armstrong et al. (2006) also find a statistically significant
positive association between option exercise and the occurrence of the current stock price
exceeding the 90th percentile of the past year’s price distribution. They argue that this
association is driven by cognitive benchmarks that employees use in their decision rules.
Given the importance of these variables in prior studies, we also include them as controls in
all of our specifications. To capture the vesting structure of the grant, the variable Vesting
event in past two weeks indicates whether the given employee-grant-day is within 2 weeks
since a vesting date for that grant. Our cognitive benchmark proxy is the variable Price ≥
90th percentile of prior year distribution, which indicates whether the current stock price is
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greater than or equal to 90th percentile of the stock price distribution over the prior year of
trading.
A prior empirical literature has found evidence that older individuals are more risk averse
in financial decision making than younger individuals and that females appear to be more risk
averse than males in their financial decisions (See Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (2001); Bellante
and Green (2004); and Armstrong et al. (2006)). Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2010)
prove that less risk averse employees are likely to exercise later and consequently the cost
of their options is greater. For 62 firms in our sample, we have information on the age and
gender of the employee. Table 5 shows that the average employee is 42-years old and 56%
of employees are male.
Employee wealth and undiversifiable portfolio risk can also have a theoretically important
effect on the exercise decision. For five firms in the sample, we have information about
employee salary and rank, which may correlate with these variables. Table 5 shows that the
mean salary in this subsample is $298,124 and 1% of employees are top executives.
In summary, the covariates used in the fractional logistic specification include the salient
state variables related to stock price paths, volatility, and market risk that have been the
focus of the recent theoretical literature on employee stock option valuation and cost. In
addition, we proxy for factors such as risk aversion and possible cognitive benchmarks using
the covariates gender, age, salary, and employment status. We use this rich set of covariates
to explore a set of theoretically motivated null hypotheses that have appeared in the recent
literature. Our predictions are: 1) the deeper in the money, the more likely the option is
to be exercised; 2) the higher dividend rate, the more likely the option is to be exercised;
3) higher volatility is an empirical question, since theoretically it could lead to either earlier
or later exercise in a utility maximizing framework; 2) more risk aversion should make early
option exercise more likely; and 4) higher correlation with the market makes earlier exercise
less likely. We report the results of these tests in the next section of the paper.
4 Estimation Results
We estimate four alternative specifications of Equation (1), using either the full sample of
voluntary exercises from all 103 firms or the subsample of 62 firms for which demographic
data are available, and with or without industry one-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Table 6
reports coefficients and standard errors in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The
estimator clusters at the level of the individual employee.
As Table 6 shows, the results are similar across the alternative specifications, and con-
sistent with predictions of optimal exercise theory. The rate of voluntary option exercise is
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strongly positively related to the level of the stock price as expected. Exercise rates are also
significantly higher when a dividend payment is imminent. Also in line with the theory of
employee option exercise, exercise rates are consistently lower when the stock return is more
highly correlated with S&P Composite Index, so that a greater fraction of the stock risk can
be hedged with reductions in exposure to the market portfolio.
As discussed above, Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2010) show that stock return
volatility and time to expiration do not have clearly signed theoretical effects on an em-
ployee’s optimal exercise policy, so the empirical effects are an open question. The results
reported in Table 6 indicate that increased levels of stock return volatility and more time
to expiration are associated with smaller fractions of options exercised, which is consistent
with the theory for ordinary American options.
Table 6 also shows that employees exercise a significantly larger fraction of outstanding
options when the stock price is greater than or equal to the 90th percentile its distribution
over the prior calendar year and in the two weeks following a vesting date of the grant in
question. As discussed previously, these results are consistent with the earlier empirical
studies of Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) and Armstrong et al. (2006), who argue that
employees may tie their exercise decisions to cognitive benchmarks as a means of reducing
monitoring costs.
Based on the subsample of firms for which information on age and gender are available,
the results in Table 6 indicate that male employees have a greater propensity to exercise
their options than female employees, and older employees are less likely to exercise options
early. These results appear to be inconsistent with the notion that women and older people
are more risk averse.
5 Option Cost to the Firm
For an individual option, the exercise function describes the expected proportion of each
outstanding option grant to be voluntarily exercised at a given time and state, conditional on
having survived to that point. If the event that the option is actually exercised is sufficiently
independent across option holders with identical exercise functions, conditional on the given
time and state, then in a large enough pool of such option holders, the fraction of options
exercised voluntarily will exactly equal the exercise function. Similarly, the termination
rate describes the fraction of options stopped through termination in a diversified pool. We
assume that such diversification is possible, or, more generally, that the conditional variance
in the number of options actually exercised around the expected value is not a priced risk in
the market, so that option valuation proceeds as if perfect diversification were possible.
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Given the estimated voluntary exercise rate per period, G(Xβ), and termination rate λ,
the value of the option is given by its expected risk-neutral discounted payoff,
Ot = E
∗
t{
∫ T
t∨tv
e−r(τ−t) (Sτ −K)+ (Gτ + λ)e−
∫ τ
t (Gs+λ) ds dτ
+e−r(T−t)e−
∫ T
t (Gs+λ) ds(ST −K)+} , (5)
where tv is the vesting date. To understand the intuition for this expression, note that G+λ
measures the expected fraction of a grant exercising or canceling, measured as a fraction of
the options still unexercised one period earlier. To calculate the expected fraction of today’s
options that exercise or cancel at date t, we therefore need to multiply by the proportion of
the grant outstanding today that has not exercised prior to t, given by
e−
∫ τ
t Gˆs+λ ds dτ.
We estimate this value with Monte Carlo simulation, using antithetic variates and im-
portance sampling to increase precision. Tables 7-8 report option values, labeled ESO Value,
for a variety of parameterizations. The tables assuming the option holder voluntarily exer-
cises according to the estimated exercise rate function in Table 6, and in addition terminates
employment at a constant rate. For the base case, we set the employee age and termination
rate equal to their sample average values. We use SIC 3 as the base case industry and set
the firm volatility to 50%, dividend rate to zero, which is representative of a technology firm.
We set the firm correlation with the market equal to 40%, the vesting period to two years,
and the option expiration date to ten years.
For comparison, the column labeled Modified Black-Scholes (MBS) gives option value
approximated as the probability of vesting times the Black-Scholes value adjusted for divi-
dends, with contractual expiration date replaced by the option’s expected term, conditional
on vesting. While new methodologies are developing, the FASB accepts this approximation
for accounting valuation, and it is used by the vast majority of firms. Like ESO Value, we
compute the option’s expected life using Monte Carlo simulation assuming the option holder
follows the estimated exercise rate function and terminates employment at a constant rate.
This expectation is with respect to the true probability measure, so it depends on the true
expected return on the stock. Formally, the option’s true expected term is
Lt = Et{
∫ T
t∨tv
τ (Gτ + λ)e
− ∫ τt∨tv (Gs+λ) ds dτ + T e− ∫ Tt∨tv (Gs+λ) ds} , (6)
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where the stock price follows
dS/S = (µ− δ) dt+ σ dZ . (7)
We assume the mean stock return is µ=11%, i.e., a 6% equity premium.
In theory, the MBS approximation can either understate or overstate the true option
value, depending on the exercise policy. To understand why, consider two special cases,
and for simplicity assume immediate vesting. First, if the option holder follows the value-
maximizing exercise policy in the presence of dividends, as in standard theory, then the true
option value will be greater than the Black-Scholes value to any deterministic expiration date,
so it will exceed the MBS approximation. Alternatively, suppose the option is stopped, either
through exercise or cancellation, at a purely exogenous rate, independent of the stock price,
without regard to whether it is in or out of the money. Then the true option value is the
average Black-Scholes value over possible stopping dates, while the MBS approximation is
Black-Scholes value to the average stopping date, so since the Black-Scholes value tends to
be concave in the option expiration date, the MBS approximation will overstate the true
value, by Jensen’s inequality. The exercise policies followed in practice contain elements of
both of these examples, and the MBS approximation can either overstate or understate the
true ESO cost.
Tables 7-8 also show option values based on the Simplified Method (SM) approved by
SAB 110 for firms without sufficient data to estimate an expected term. The SM value is
the probability of vesting times the Black-Scholes value adjusted for dividends, with term
equal to the average of the option’s vesting date and expiration date.
The left side of Tables 7 and 8 focuses on the case of at-the-money options at their
grant date. The right side considers so-called “underwater” options, two years after grant,
vested, but 40% out of the money. After the steep decline in the stock market during the
financial crisis, most firms found that the options they granted to employees before the crash
were deeply out of the money during 2008 and 2009. Many firms offered their employees
equal-present-value exchanges of at-the-money options for the old out-of-the-money options,
perhaps in an effort to restore performance incentives. In general, the MBS value overstates
option value for the parameterizations considered here and the overstatement is even greater
for the underwater options than for the at-the-money options. The SM value also tends to
overstate grant date option value for the parametrizations here, but its percent errors for
the underwater options are centered around zero.
Table 7 shows the effects of changing firm stock return characteristics. The first panel
presents volatility effects. As Table 6 shows, increasing volatility reduces the estimated
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exercise rate, and this also increases the option’s expected life. Both the true ESO value
and its MBS value increase with volatility. True ESO value increases more slowly with
volatility than the MBS approximation does, so the overstatement increases significantly
with volatility. Our intuition is that as volatility increases and the stock return distribution
becomes more skewed, the probability of the option being out of the money approaches one,
which gives an extra boost to option expected term and the MBS value. Indeed, expected
term can increase with volatility even when the exercise rate coefficient on volatility is
positive. But this boost in expected term is without a commensurate increase in ESO value,
because on average, early exercise, conditional on being in the money, keeps the option payoff
from the reaching extreme values that it would reach if the option life were deterministic, as
the MBS approximation assumes.
The second panel shows the effect of increasing the dividend rate. This increases the
estimated exercise rate, conditional on the option being vested and in the money, but uni-
formly reduces future possible stock prices, and ESO value declines with the the dividend
rate. The option’s expected term, conditional on vesting, actually increases slightly, because
more stock price paths stay out of the money longer, but the MBS option value declines even
faster than the true option value, so the error declines in algebraic value. This may be be-
cause the value-maximizing policy calls for some early exercise prior to a dividend payment,
and the estimated empirical exercise policy comes closer to that than the deterministic-time
exercise policy implicit in the MBS approximation.
The third panel of Table 7 shows the effect of increasing stock return correlation with
the market. This reduces the estimated exercise rate, as shown in Table 6, which increases
option value. It also increases the option’s average life, which increase the MBS value. The
MBS approximation error remains relatively constant.
Table 8 considers certain employee, contract, and market effects. The first panel shows
how option value varies with the termination rate. A higher termination rate increases
the chance of pre-vesting forfeiture, the chance of post-vesting cancellation, and the rate of
suboptimal early exercise, so it reduces option value. It also reduces option life, so the MBS
approximation also declines.
The second panel of Table 8 illustrates the effect of increasing the vesting period. A
longer vesting period increases the risk of pre-vesting forfeiture, which reduces option value.
Conditional on vesting, the option stopping time has less room to vary, so the difference
between the option value and the MBS approximation shrinks.
In both Table 7 and Table 8, the Simplified Method approximation errors vary systemat-
ically with the underlying stock return parameters and the option contractual features. This
suggests that there is no simple adjustment to Black-Scholes value that can approximate
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ESO value without systematically overstating or understating option value for particular
kinds of firms or options.
The third panel of Table 8 shows how estimated option values vary across industry in
our sample, in other words, as the estimated constant term varies with industry. This shows
how option valuation can be customized to a specific industry, while still using information
about exercise patterns from a larger sample of firms and their stock price paths. Again, the
MBS and SM approximation errors can vary widely.
6 Conclusions
This paper is the first to perform a complete empirical estimation of employee stock option
exercise behavior and option cost to firms. We develop a methodology for estimating option
exercise and cancellation rates as a function of the stock price path, time to expiration,
and firm and option holder characteristics. Our estimation is based on a fractional logistic
approach, and accounts for correlation between exercises by the same executive. Valuation
proceeds by using the estimated exercise rate function to describe the option’s expected
payoff along each stock price path, and then computing the present value of the payoff. The
estimation of empirical exercise rates also allows us to test the predictions of theoretical
models of option exercise behavior.
We apply our estimation technique to the largest dataset yet analyzed in the literature,
consisting of a comprehensive sample of option exercise grant and exercise data for all em-
ployees at 103 publicly traded firms from 1981 to 2009. Our results indicate that using
standard pricing approximations, such as the adjusted Black-Scholes method suggested by
FASB, can lead to significant errors. The proprietary data used in this study were provided
by corporate participants in a sponsored research project that was funded by the Society of
Actuaries, who hope that the results of our study will eventually be used as the standard set
of exercise assumptions to be used in calculating ESO values on firms’ income statements.
18
References
Armstrong, C. S., A. D. Jagolinzer, and D. F. Larcker, 2006, Timing of employee stock option
exercises and the valuation of stock option expense, Working paper, Stanford University.
Bajtelsmit, V., and A. Bernasek, 2001, Risk preferences and the investment decisions of
older Americans, Working paper, American Association of Retired Persons (Washington,
D.C.).
Baum, C. F., M. E. Schaffer, and S. Stillman, 2003, Instrumental variables and GMM:
Estimation and testing, Stata Journal 3, 1–31.
Bellante, D., and C. Green, 2004, Relative risk aversion among the elderly, Review of Finan-
cial Economics 13, 269–281.
Bettis, J. C., J. M. Bizjak, and M. L. Lemmon, 2005, Exercise behavior, valuation, and the
incentive effects of employee stock options, Journal of Financial Economics 76, 445–470.
Carpenter, J., R. Stanton, and N. Wallace, 2010, Optimal exercise of executive stock options
and implications for firm cost, Journal of Financial Economics 98, 315–337.
Carpenter, J. N., 1998, The exercise and valuation of executive stock options, Journal of
Financial Economics 48, 127–158.
Carr, P., and V. Linetsky, 2000, The valuation of executive stock options in an intensity
based framework, European Financial Review 4, 211–230.
Cox, D. R., 1972, Regression models and life tables (with discussion), Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society 34, 187–220.
Cvitanic´, J., Z. Wiener, and F. Zapatero, 2008, Analytic pricing of executive stock options,
Review of Financial Studies 21, 683–724.
Detemple, J., and S. Sundaresan, 1999, Nontraded asset valuation with portfolio constraints:
A binomial approach, Review of Financial Studies 12, 835–872.
Duffie, D., and K. J. Singleton, 1999, Modeling term structures of defaultable bonds, Review
of Financial Studies 12, 687–720.
Equilar, 2011, 2011 Equity trends report: Update, Technical report, Equilar, Inc.
Ferrari, S. L., and F. Cribari-Neto, 2004, Beta regression for modeling rates and proportions,
Journal of Applied Statistics 31, 799–815.
Frydman, C., and D. Jenter, 2010, CEO compensation, Working paper, NBER Working
Paper 16585.
Gourie´roux, C., A. Monfort, and A. Trognon, 1984, Pseudo-maximum likelihood methods:
Theory, Econometrica 52, 681–700.
Grasselli, M. R., and V. Henderson, 2009, Risk aversion and block exercise of executive stock
options, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33, 109–127.
19
Heath, C., S. Huddart, and M. Lang, 1999, Psychological factors and stock option exercise,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 601–627.
Huddart, S., 1994, Employee stock options, Journal of Accounting and Economics 18, 207–
231.
Huddart, S., and M. Lang, 1996, Employee stock option exercises: An empirical analysis,
Journal of Accounting and Economics 21, 5–43.
Hull, J., and A. White, 2004, How to value employee stock options, Financial Analysts
Journal 60, 114–119.
Ingersoll, J., 2006, The subjective and objective evaluation of incentive stock options, Journal
of Business 79, 453–487.
Jennergren, L. P., and B. Na¨slund, 1993, A comment on “Valuation of executive stock options
and the FASB proposal”, Accounting Review 68, 179–183.
Kalbfleisch, J. D., and R. L. Prentice, 1980, The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data
(John Wiley, New York).
Kim, I. J., 1990, The analytic valuation of American options, Review of Financial Studies
3, 547–572.
Klein, D., and E. Maug, 2009, How do executives exercise stock options?, Working paper,
Mannheim Finance Working Paper 2209-01.
Leung, T., and R. Sircar, 2009, Accounting for risk aversion, vesting, job termination risk
and multiple exercises in valuation of employee stock options, Mathematical Finance 19,
99–128.
Li, D. X., 2001, On default correlation: A copula function approach, Working paper, Risk-
Metrics Group.
Mullahy, J., 1990, Regression models and transformations for beta-distributed outcomes,
Working paper, Trinity College.
Papke, L. E., and J. M. Wooldridge, 1996, Econometric methods for fractional response
variables with an application to 401(k) plan participation rates, Journal of Applied Econo-
metrics 11, 619–632.
Petersen, M. A., 2009, Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing
approaches, Review of Financial Studies 22, 435–480.
Rogers, W., 1993, Regression standard errors in clustered samples, Stata Technical Bulletin
13, pp. 19–23.
Schwartz, E. S., and W. N. Torous, 1989, Prepayment and the valuation of mortgage-backed
securities, Journal of Finance 44, 375–392.
Wooldridge, J. M., 2003, Cluster-sample methods in applied econometrics, American Eco-
nomic Review 93, 133–138.
20
T
ab
le
1:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
S
am
p
le
F
ir
m
s
T
h
is
ta
b
le
p
ro
v
id
es
fi
n
an
ci
al
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
su
m
m
a
ry
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
th
e
1
0
3
fi
rm
s
in
o
u
r
sa
m
p
le
,
g
ro
u
p
ed
b
y
o
n
e-
d
ig
it
S
IC
co
d
e.
S
ta
rt
S
a
m
p
le
is
th
e
ea
rl
ie
st
op
ti
on
gr
an
t
d
at
e
in
ou
r
sa
m
p
le
an
d
E
n
d
S
a
m
p
le
is
th
e
la
st
d
ay
th
a
t
w
e
tr
a
ck
a
ll
g
ra
n
ts
a
n
d
ex
er
ci
se
ev
en
ts
in
th
e
sa
m
p
le
fo
r
a
ll
o
f
th
e
fi
rm
s.
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
s
is
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
m
ea
n
of
th
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
em
p
lo
ye
es
fo
r
th
e
fi
rm
s
a
s
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
C
o
m
p
u
st
a
t
a
s
“
E
m
p
lo
ye
es
:
T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s”
(D
A
T
A
29
).
M
ar
k
et
C
ap
is
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
m
ea
n
o
f
“
C
o
m
m
o
n
S
h
a
re
s
O
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g:
M
il
li
o
n
s”
in
C
o
m
p
u
st
a
t
(D
A
T
A
2
5
)
m
u
lt
ip
li
ed
b
y
“
P
ri
ce
m
in
u
s
F
is
ca
l
Y
ea
r
C
lo
se
”
in
C
om
p
u
st
at
(D
A
T
A
19
9)
.
M
a
rk
et
-t
o
-B
o
o
k
is
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
m
ea
n
o
f
th
e
th
e
M
a
rk
et
C
a
p
sc
a
le
d
b
y
co
m
m
o
n
eq
u
it
y
a
s
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
C
om
p
u
st
at
(D
A
T
A
60
).
R
ev
en
u
e
is
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
m
ea
n
o
f
“
S
a
le
s/
T
u
rn
o
ve
r”
in
C
o
m
p
u
st
a
t
(D
A
T
A
1
2
).
R
ev
en
u
e
G
ro
w
th
is
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
m
ea
n
of
(R
ev
en
u
e t
/R
ev
en
u
e t
−
1
−
1)
.
N
et
In
co
m
e
is
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
m
ea
n
o
f
“
N
et
In
co
m
e”
in
C
o
m
p
u
st
a
t
(D
A
T
A
1
7
2
).
V
o
la
ti
li
ty
is
th
e
av
er
a
g
e
st
o
ck
re
tu
rn
v
ol
at
il
it
y
ov
er
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
.
D
iv
id
en
d
ra
te
is
th
e
av
er
a
g
e
d
iv
id
en
d
ra
te
ov
er
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
.
C
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
is
th
e
av
er
a
g
e
co
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
fi
rm
re
tu
rn
an
d
re
tu
rn
on
th
e
C
R
S
P
S
&
P
C
o
m
p
o
si
te
In
d
ex
ov
er
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
.
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
&
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
T
ra
n
sp
or
ta
ti
on
,
R
et
ai
l
F
in
an
ce
,
S
er
v
ic
es
C
om
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
s
In
su
ra
n
ce
,
&
U
ti
li
ti
es
&
R
ea
l
E
st
at
e
O
n
D
ig
it
S
IC
1
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
&
9
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
F
ir
m
s
19
29
3
14
14
17
7
S
ta
rt
S
am
p
le
3/
3
1/
1
9
82
12
/3
1/
19
81
12
/3
1/
19
92
6/
28
/1
98
5
3/
31
/1
98
2
3/
31
/1
98
6
9/
30
/1
99
1
E
n
d
S
am
p
le
1
2/
3
1
/2
0
0
7
12
/3
1/
20
09
11
/1
/2
00
7
6/
11
/2
00
8
12
/2
7/
20
07
12
/3
1/
20
09
11
/1
/2
00
7
E
m
p
lo
ye
es
(0
0
0
’s
)
8.
43
5.
94
19
.1
5
24
.3
1
11
.8
5
8.
83
3.
57
M
ar
ke
t
C
ap
($
M
il
li
on
s)
2,
30
9
.4
9
1,
74
8.
69
9,
57
8.
27
2,
67
5.
09
5,
31
4.
62
1,
85
9.
17
64
6.
31
M
ar
ke
t-
to
-B
o
o
k
5.
06
11
.6
6
2.
52
4.
16
2.
37
5.
73
7.
30
R
ev
en
u
e
($
M
il
li
on
s)
1,
96
5
.0
2
86
6.
05
3,
44
6.
75
4,
96
2.
56
3,
56
9.
51
1,
02
9.
78
35
5.
50
N
et
In
co
m
e
($
M
il
li
on
s)
1
0
1.
71
33
.7
3
25
0.
82
10
1.
63
31
6.
19
25
.1
9
22
.2
3
V
ol
at
il
it
y
0
.5
40
0.
55
6
0.
31
7
0.
46
0
0.
28
6
0.
60
3
0.
58
7
D
iv
id
en
d
R
at
e
0.
00
7
0.
00
3
0.
02
2
0.
00
4
0.
00
9
0.
03
7
0.
06
5
C
or
re
la
ti
on
0.
31
0
0.
34
6
0.
37
2
0.
35
8
0.
35
4
0.
33
4
0.
25
3
21
T
ab
le
2:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
P
ro
p
ri
et
ar
y
O
p
ti
on
D
at
a:
S
am
p
le
S
iz
e
an
d
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
&
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
a
ti
o
n
,
R
et
a
il
F
in
a
n
ce
,
S
er
v
ic
es
A
ll
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
s
In
su
ra
n
ce
,
&
U
ti
li
ti
es
&
R
ea
l
E
st
a
te
S
IC
(o
n
e
d
ig
it
)
1
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
P
an
el
A
.
A
gg
re
ga
te
N
u
m
b
er
of
E
m
p
lo
ye
es
,
G
ra
n
ts
,
a
n
d
E
x
er
ci
se
E
ve
n
ts
N
u
m
b
er
of
E
m
p
lo
ye
es
18
4,
23
5
1
2
1
,8
3
2
1
1
,8
7
4
3
6
,6
4
8
1
1
5
,1
5
2
5
3
,9
9
5
6
,5
3
0
5
3
0
,2
6
6
N
u
m
b
er
of
G
ra
n
ts
36
7,
12
1
3
5
3
,8
2
6
1
8
,1
2
3
1
2
7
,0
9
0
2
7
4
,9
3
7
1
5
6
,5
3
1
1
5
,0
9
6
1
,3
1
2
,7
2
4
N
u
m
b
er
of
E
x
er
ci
se
s
6,
26
2,
23
0
6
,4
6
1
,8
7
3
2
2
7
,5
8
7
2
,1
8
9
,2
6
2
4
,8
8
0
,6
6
1
2
,4
1
5
,3
0
7
2
5
7
,9
5
5
2
2
,6
9
4
,8
7
5
P
an
el
B
.
N
u
m
b
er
of
G
ra
n
ts
p
er
E
m
p
lo
ye
e
M
ea
n
2.
00
2
.9
1
1
.5
8
3
.4
6
2
.4
0
2
.8
0
2
.3
1
2
.4
7
M
ed
ia
n
2.
00
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
2
.0
0
1
.0
0
2
.0
0
1
.0
0
2
.0
0
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
on
1.
40
3
.3
8
1
.4
4
3
.2
6
2
.7
7
2
.8
9
2
.2
2
2
.6
2
M
in
im
u
m
1.
00
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
M
ax
im
u
m
53
.0
0
3
5
.0
0
1
6
.0
0
2
7
.0
0
7
4
.0
0
4
7
.0
0
2
6
.0
0
7
4
.0
0
22
T
ab
le
3:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
P
ro
p
ri
et
ar
y
O
p
ti
on
D
at
a:
G
ra
n
t
S
iz
e
an
d
C
on
tr
ac
tu
al
F
ea
tu
re
s
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
&
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
a
ti
o
n
,
R
et
a
il
F
in
a
n
ce
,
S
er
v
ic
es
A
ll
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
s
In
su
ra
n
ce
,
&
U
ti
li
ti
es
&
R
ea
l
E
st
a
te
S
IC
(o
n
e
d
ig
it
)
1
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
P
an
el
A
.
D
ol
la
r
V
al
u
e
of
U
n
d
er
ly
in
g
S
h
ar
es
(p
er
G
ra
n
t)
M
ea
n
25
,0
05
.4
9
46
,9
40
.6
7
1
9
,4
1
1
.6
1
5
3
,0
9
5
.8
4
1
0
5
,8
8
6
.9
4
6
0
,9
0
5
.6
2
4
1
,3
2
2
.3
6
4
9
,9
8
4
.3
2
M
ed
ia
n
5,
70
0.
00
12
,8
25
.0
0
3
,2
1
1
.9
5
1
1
,5
6
2
.5
3
2
5
,3
6
2
.6
9
2
6
,1
2
5
.0
0
1
0
,9
7
6
.0
0
1
0
,1
8
7
.5
0
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
on
19
0,
76
2.
67
28
2,
42
3.
8
3
1
7
8
,1
0
2
.4
7
2
9
8
,2
9
7
.8
8
7
1
2
,0
9
8
.8
8
4
6
7
,0
0
2
.7
8
2
0
1
,5
1
7
.1
2
3
8
4
,2
4
0
.4
7
M
in
im
u
m
2.
49
3.
1
6
7
.3
2
1
4
.8
1
9
.8
9
3
.6
0
1
.0
2
1
.0
2
M
ax
im
u
m
52
,5
00
,0
00
.0
0
45
,2
38
,1
35
.5
0
2
9
,6
0
0
,5
9
2
.0
0
5
8
,6
0
0
,0
0
0
.0
0
1
5
4
,4
4
0
,0
0
0
.0
0
1
7
9
,6
0
0
,0
0
0
.0
0
1
4
,5
8
7
,0
6
5
.1
2
1
7
9
,6
0
0
,0
0
0
.0
0
P
an
el
B
.
M
ax
im
u
m
N
u
m
b
er
of
V
es
ti
n
g
P
er
io
d
s
p
er
G
ra
n
t
M
ea
n
2.
67
7.
32
1
.3
1
3
.3
0
2
.9
1
4
.8
7
3
.2
6
4
.1
3
M
ed
ia
n
1.
00
4.
0
0
1
.0
0
3
.0
0
3
.0
0
4
.0
0
3
.0
0
3
.0
0
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
on
7.
36
9.
46
0
.8
6
1
.3
4
1
.1
3
5
.8
8
1
.2
5
6
.7
5
M
in
im
u
m
1.
00
1.
0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
M
ax
im
u
m
60
.0
0
49
.0
0
7
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
8
.0
0
4
9
.0
0
5
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
P
an
el
C
.
P
er
ce
n
t
of
O
p
ti
on
s
th
at
V
es
t
on
th
e
F
ir
st
V
es
ti
n
g
D
a
te
(p
er
G
ra
n
t)
M
ea
n
91
.0
2
33
.6
3
9
2
.4
1
3
8
.7
3
4
8
.1
1
3
7
.0
6
3
5
.8
7
5
6
.8
8
M
ed
ia
n
10
0.
00
25
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
3
3
.3
3
3
3
.3
3
2
5
.0
0
3
3
.3
3
3
3
.3
3
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
on
25
.0
1
26
.7
7
2
0
.6
3
2
6
.7
7
2
9
.1
4
2
8
.4
6
1
4
.3
7
3
6
.6
6
M
in
im
u
m
1.
67
2.
0
8
1
.1
5
1
.6
7
1
2
.5
0
2
.0
8
2
0
.0
0
1
.1
5
M
ax
im
u
m
10
0.
00
10
0.
0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
P
an
el
D
.
N
u
m
b
er
of
M
on
th
s
fr
om
G
ra
n
t
to
F
u
ll
V
es
ti
n
g
(p
er
G
ra
n
t)
M
ea
n
19
.4
8
45
.0
8
1
1
.0
5
4
0
.9
9
3
3
.2
1
4
1
.2
6
3
9
.1
7
3
2
.4
4
M
ed
ia
n
12
.0
0
48
.0
0
0
.0
0
3
6
.0
0
3
6
.0
0
4
8
.0
0
3
6
.0
0
3
6
.0
0
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
on
12
.6
2
19
.6
1
1
7
.9
4
1
4
.9
1
1
7
.7
9
1
8
.4
9
1
5
.0
1
2
1
.1
0
M
in
im
u
m
0.
00
0.
0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
M
ax
im
u
m
85
.0
0
84
.0
0
8
5
.0
0
8
4
.0
0
8
5
.0
0
7
2
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
8
5
.0
0
P
an
el
E
.
N
u
m
b
er
of
M
on
th
s
fr
om
G
ra
n
t
to
E
x
p
ir
at
io
n
(p
er
G
ra
n
t)
M
ea
n
10
3.
33
78
.9
5
9
3
.4
7
1
2
2
.4
3
1
2
0
.1
7
1
2
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
0
2
.2
5
M
ed
ia
n
12
0.
00
12
0.
0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
on
31
.5
6
53
.1
4
3
9
.8
9
1
1
.8
1
0
.3
8
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
3
8
.4
7
M
in
im
u
m
1.
00
1.
0
0
3
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
.0
0
M
ax
im
u
m
24
0.
00
12
0.
0
0
2
4
0
.0
0
1
8
0
.0
0
1
2
1
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
2
4
0
.0
0
23
T
ab
le
4:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
P
ro
p
ri
et
ar
y
O
p
ti
on
D
at
a:
E
x
er
ci
se
P
at
te
rn
s
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
&
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
a
ti
o
n
,
R
et
a
il
F
in
a
n
ce
,
S
er
v
ic
es
A
ll
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
s
In
su
ra
n
ce
,
&
U
ti
li
ti
es
&
R
ea
l
E
st
a
te
S
IC
(o
n
e
d
ig
it
)
1
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
P
an
el
A
.
N
u
m
b
er
of
D
ay
s
R
em
ai
n
in
g
to
E
x
p
ir
a
ti
o
n
o
n
E
x
er
ci
se
D
a
te
(p
er
E
x
er
ci
se
E
v
en
t)
M
ea
n
1,
57
2.
58
2
,1
0
7
.5
5
2
,4
4
7
.6
8
2
,2
1
6
.4
5
2
,2
9
0
.6
0
2
,5
9
3
.9
1
2
,4
9
6
.5
1
2
,0
5
4
.8
2
M
ed
ia
n
1,
67
5.
00
2
,4
3
9
.0
0
2
,5
3
0
.0
0
2
,3
5
7
.0
0
2
,3
9
7
.0
0
2
,7
3
9
.0
0
2
,7
3
6
.5
0
2
,3
6
0
.0
0
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
on
1,
20
3.
41
1
,0
4
9
.6
4
6
1
2
.4
5
8
7
5
.4
0
7
3
6
.2
3
6
6
1
.3
7
6
9
9
.1
3
1
,0
4
1
.6
1
M
in
im
u
m
0.
00
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
M
ax
im
u
m
3,
64
3.
00
3
,6
4
9
.0
0
3
,4
7
8
.0
0
5
,2
9
2
.0
0
3
,6
5
0
.0
0
3
,6
2
7
.0
0
3
,5
2
5
.0
0
5
,2
9
2
.0
0
P
an
el
B
.
N
u
m
b
er
of
D
ay
s
th
e
O
p
ti
on
w
a
s
In
-t
h
e-
M
o
n
ey
fr
o
m
V
es
ti
n
g
D
a
te
to
E
x
er
ci
se
D
a
te
(p
er
E
x
er
ci
se
E
ve
n
t)
M
ea
n
45
0.
66
2
4
7
.8
5
1
,1
0
5
.9
4
2
6
3
.2
4
3
2
9
.8
2
2
3
7
.2
4
2
3
7
.3
0
2
9
2
.3
7
M
ed
ia
n
72
.0
0
6
7
.0
0
2
2
3
.0
0
9
6
.0
0
1
4
9
.0
0
3
1
.0
0
1
2
8
.0
0
8
6
.0
0
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
on
76
3.
04
4
0
9
.3
2
1
,3
7
2
.8
6
4
3
1
.5
8
4
7
4
.3
7
4
4
0
.5
2
3
2
3
.8
8
4
9
4
.9
7
M
in
im
u
m
1.
00
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
M
ax
im
u
m
3,
66
5.
00
2
,9
2
9
.0
0
3
,9
9
0
.0
0
3
,5
2
7
.0
0
3
,2
1
7
.0
0
3
,6
4
6
.0
0
2
,5
6
3
.0
0
3
,9
9
0
.0
0
P
an
el
C
.
R
at
io
of
S
to
ck
P
ri
ce
to
S
tr
ik
e
P
ri
ce
a
t
E
x
er
ci
se
D
a
te
(p
er
E
x
er
ci
se
E
ve
n
t)
M
ea
n
3.
65
3
.5
0
1
.9
2
4
.4
5
5
.7
6
5
.4
5
6
.6
7
4
.3
9
M
ed
ia
n
3.
12
2
.2
1
1
.8
1
2
.0
5
2
.6
1
2
.9
8
2
.1
7
2
.8
6
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
on
2.
05
5
.8
7
0
.6
7
5
.1
6
7
.5
0
9
.2
9
1
4
.6
7
6
.1
2
M
in
im
u
m
1.
01
1
.0
2
1
.0
1
1
.0
3
1
.0
1
1
.0
2
1
.0
1
1
.0
2
M
ax
im
u
m
10
1.
92
1
9
7
.9
7
9
.4
4
9
5
.6
5
1
4
7
.5
8
1
9
2
.2
7
2
1
5
.2
6
2
1
5
.2
6
P
an
el
D
.
W
h
et
h
er
S
to
ck
P
ri
ce
≥
90
th
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
o
f
P
ri
o
r
Y
ea
r
D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
(p
er
E
x
er
ci
se
E
ve
n
t)
M
ea
n
0.
49
0
.6
1
0
.4
9
0
.5
6
0
.5
7
0
.5
6
0
.5
1
0
.5
5
M
ed
ia
n
0.
00
1
.0
0
0
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
on
0.
50
0
.4
9
0
.5
0
0
.5
0
0
.4
9
0
.5
0
0
.5
0
0
.5
0
M
in
im
u
m
1.
00
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
M
ax
im
u
m
0.
00
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
P
an
el
E
.
F
ra
ct
io
n
of
G
ra
n
t’
s
V
es
te
d
O
p
ti
o
n
s
th
a
t
a
re
E
x
er
ci
se
d
(p
er
E
x
er
ci
se
E
v
en
t)
M
ea
n
0.
96
0
.8
5
0
.9
4
0
.7
4
0
.8
1
0
.7
1
0
.9
4
0
.8
5
M
ed
ia
n
1.
00
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
on
0.
15
0
.2
8
0
.1
9
0
.3
4
0
.2
9
0
.3
7
0
.1
7
0
.2
8
M
in
im
u
m
0.
00
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
M
ax
im
u
m
1.
00
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
.0
0
24
Table 5: Employee Characteristics
This table presents summary statistics for the demographic information that is reported by a subset of the
firms in the sample. We summarize the information by employees over the sample period.
Number Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum
of Employees Deviation
Age 248225 41.94 41.50 10.18 20.00 85.00
Male 241076 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Executive 329058 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00
Salary 52743 298,124 39,144 3,631,444 10,001 368,352,000
25
Table 6: Estimation Results
This table presents the results for alternative specifications of the fractional logistic estimator. Specifications
1 and 2 are estimated on the full sample. In specification 1, we exclude the sex, age, and industry fixed
effects. Specification 2 includes industry (one-digit SIC code) fixed effects and again excludes the sex and age
covariates. Specifications 3 and 4 are estimated with a smaller subsample of firms that reported information
on sex and age. Specification 3 includes sex and age and excludes industry fixed effects. Specification 4
includes sex, age and industry fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses below the
coefficient estimates. The estimator clusters at the level of the individual employee.
Alternative Specifications
1 2 3 4
Covariates
Constant -5.5973 -4.6373 -5.4517 -5.8975
(0.0084) (0.0094) (0.0186) (0.0253)
Price-to-strike ratio 0.0054 0.0064 0.0152 0.0158
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Dividend in next two weeks 2.2369 3.9773 14.7871 18.4637
(0.0554) (0.0661) (1.2119) (1.1888)
Correlation -0.8754 -0.5849 -0.6590 -0.5975
(0.0096) (0.0101) (0.0137) (0.0145)
Volatility -13.5554 -18.7566 -13.1809 -18.0737
(0.1829) (0.2073) (0.2933) (0.3445)
Time to expiration -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000003) (0.000004)
Vesting event in past two weeks 2.8675 2.7265 3.0740 3.0441
(0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0064) (0.0067)
Price ≥ 90th percentile of prior year distribution 0.3940 0.3993 0.4286 0.4322
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0054) (0.0054)
Age -0.0081 -0.0066
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Male 0.2122 0.1831
(0.0056) (0.0058)
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Number of observations (employee-grant-days) 362,535,204 362,535,204 217,348,920 217,348,920
26
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